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Revisiting the link between body 
and agency: visual movement 
congruency enhances intentional 
binding but is not body-specific
Regine Zopf1,2,3, Vince Polito1,2 & James Moore1,4
Embodiment and agency are key aspects of how we perceive ourselves that have typically been 
associated with independent mechanisms. Recent work, however, has suggested that these 
mechanisms are related. The sense of agency arises from recognising a causal influence on the 
external world. This influence is typically realised through bodily movements and thus the perception 
of the bodily self could also be crucial for agency. We investigated whether a key index of agency – 
intentional binding – was modulated by body-specific information. Participants judged the interval 
between pressing a button and a subsequent tone. We used virtual reality to manipulate two aspects 
of movement feedback. First, form: participants viewed a virtual hand or sphere. Second, movement 
congruency: the viewed object moved congruently or incongruently with the participant’s hidden hand. 
Both factors, form and movement congruency, significantly influenced embodiment. However, only 
movement congruency influenced intentional binding. Binding was increased for congruent compared to 
incongruent movement feedback irrespective of form. This shows that the comparison between viewed 
and performed movements provides an important cue for agency, whereas body-specific visual form 
does not. We suggest that embodiment and agency mechanisms both depend on comparisons across 
sensorimotor signals but that they are influenced by distinct factors.
Typically, we perceive ourselves as distinct from others and the environment, and this distinction is crucial for 
our interactions with the external world. Two key aspects of self-perception are the sense of embodiment and the 
sense of agency1,2. The sense of embodiment involves the ability to perceive that one’s own body belongs to oneself 
and to know its location3. Whereas, the sense of agency involves the ability to perceive that one is initiating, exe-
cuting and controlling one’s own voluntary actions and their effects4,5.
Embodiment and agency have typically been thought to rely on mostly independent mechanisms6,7. 
However, recent findings have also suggested some links between these two self-perception components5,6,8–14. 
Understanding similarities and differences between embodiment and agency mechanisms will have important 
implications for understanding how both can be altered in clinical disorders such as schizophrenia4,15–19, or when 
interacting with technological tools, such as virtual reality and prosthesis5,8,20–23.
The cognitive mechanisms underlying embodiment and agency might be related. Our sense of agency arises 
from recognising our causal influence on the external world. Typically, this influence is realised through bodily 
movements that link our intentions to subsequent effects or outcomes5. Thus, the perception of the bodily self 
could be crucial for both embodiment and agency mechanisms. Consequently, one approach to further under-
stand the links between embodiment and agency is to investigate the extent to which both are affected by specific 
bodily self-cues5,6,9,24.
Bodily self-cues have been studied extensively within the context of the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) para-
digm and its variants. In this paradigm an artificial hand is viewed next to one’s own hand, which is hidden from 
view. The artificial hand may be a model hand, robotic, or a 2D- or 3D-image on a computer or head-mounted 
screen6,8,12,25,26. When the artificial hand is touched or made to move at the same time as the participant’s hand, 
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this leads to the sense of embodiment. Participants may report feeling body ownership for the artificial body and 
feeling that their real limb is located closer in space to the artificial limb6,12,25,27. Crucially, experimental para-
digms, such as the RHI, allow researchers to manipulate bodily self-cues by creating conflicts between visual and 
non-visual signals.
RHI research has shown that one bodily self-cue that is important for embodiment is the temporal congru-
ency between multisensory signals27. For example, when one views an artificial or virtual hand that moves at 
the same time as one’s own hand, then this can induce strong feelings of embodiment for the external hand6,8. 
However, when a delay between performed movement and visual movement feedback is presented, embodi-
ment is reduced6,8. In contrast, agency is typically less affected by temporal delays8,24,28. For example, Ismail and 
Shimada24 employed a robot hand illusion and found embodiment effects were abolished when the delay between 
performed and viewed robot hand movement was 290 ms and larger. Agency on the other hand was somewhat 
reduced with a 290 ms delay, but was only completely abolished with a 590 ms delay. This suggests that temporal 
comparisons between visual and non-visual signals influence both embodiment and agency. However, the time 
window for matching these signals is wider for agency than it is for embodiment.
In contrast to these findings, Caspar et al.5 have shown that both embodiment and agency are similarly affected 
by a more complex type of visual movement congruency cue. In their study participants performed simple index 
finger movements and viewed a robotic hand, which made either matching index finger movements (congruent 
effector condition) or similar movements of the little finger (incongruent effector condition). The authors found 
that effector movement incongruence significantly reduced embodiment and agency. Based on these results, 
Caspar et al.5 suggest that agency is affected by a body effector-specific matching mechanisms between visual and 
non-visual signals.
Interestingly, however, Ebert and Wegner29 have previously shown that movement congruency can affect 
agency even without body-specific visual movement feedback. These researchers used a paradigm in which par-
ticipants were asked to either push or pull a joystick. After different delays, participants then viewed images on 
the screen that moved in a direction that was either congruent or incongruent with their joystick movement. 
Movement direction incongruence significantly reduced agency and the authors concluded that action-event 
consistency is an important agency signal.
Together, the previous research findings by Caspar et al.5 and Ebert & Wegner (2010) show that move-
ment congruency influences agency in the contexts of both body-specific as well as body-non-specific visual 
movement feedback. This suggests that agency is affected by a general mechanism that involves comparisons 
between visual and non-visual movement signals. In other words, it seems that in these cases a general mecha-
nism compares internal and/or proprioceptive information associated with the generation of a movement with 
visual feedback about that movement. This matching mechanism may however be modulated by body-specific 
cues. To test this, it is necessary to compare the effect of movement congruency across both body-specific and 
body-non-specific contexts. Thus, the aim of our study, was to investigate the effect of movement congruency 
on agency in the context of viewing a realistic body form as well as when viewing a non-body object. We 
employed a virtual hand setup30 to test the impact of two bodily self-cues on agency. First, we manipulated 
viewed object form: participants either viewed a virtual hand or a virtual sphere movement as they were mov-
ing their own hidden finger. Second, we manipulated viewed movement congruency: the virtual object moved 
either in the same direction or the opposite direction as the participant’s actual finger, as they made a button 
press movement.
To quantify embodiment we used standard RHI scale items3. To quantify agency, in line with the previous 
studies5,29, we employed an implicit agency measure known as the “intentional binding” effect. Implicit measures 
index agency indirectly by investigating how agency cues affect other perceptual tasks. The intentional binding 
effect is a compression of the perceived temporal interval between an action and its outcome31. We also employed 
an explicit measure of agency. Explicit agency measures involve a direct conceptual judgement, typically obtained 
using rating scales4. Elbert and Wegner (2010) measured explicit agency using a single scale item asking partic-
ipants how much it felt that their action caused the external event. In contrast, Caspar et al.5 asked participants 
to rate experiences specific to the hand movements such as “I felt as if I was controlling the movements of the 
artificial hand”. However, these types of rating scales conceptualise agency as a unidimensional construct; that is, 
these measures imply that sense of agency is a single dimension that varies only in degree. Recent work however 
suggests that agency is better understood as being comprised of multiple distinct elements4,32,33. Here we investi-
gated the influence of our chosen bodily self-cues using a standardised scale that assesses multiple components 
of the sense of agency8,34.
We predicted that both form and movement congruency would influence embodiment ratings. For agency, 
based on the combined findings of Caspar et al.5 and Ebert and Wegner (2010) we expected a main effect of 
movement congruency for implicit and explicit measures. Furthermore, if agency is modulated by body specific 
movement information, then we would expect a main effect of form or an interaction of form and movement 
congruency.
Methods
Participants. Thirty volunteers were recruited via the Macquarie University Cognitive Science Participant 
Register (18 female; age M = 20.97 years, SD = 3.64 years, range 18–32 years). All participants were right-handed, 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and received $15. This research was conducted in accordance with the 
ethical standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the Macquarie University 
Ethics Review Committee (Human Research). Written informed consent was obtained from all participants prior 
to the start of the experiment.
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Apparatus and Setup. To manipulate the visual feedback of performed finger movements, we used a virtual 
hand setup (Fig. 1). The setup consisted of a glove-based system (CyberGlove Systems) for capturing detailed 
hand movements, a magnetic motion capture system (Polhemus Fastrak) for capturing wrist movements, and a 
3D screen (Hyundai TriDef, 60 Hz refresh rate) for visualizing movements. The 3D screen was mounted on top of a 
custom-built frame and participants viewed the screen’s images in a mirror that was mounted in the middle of the 
frame. The images appeared at approximately the same depth and location as the participants’ hidden hands which 
were placed on a hand-rest under the mirror. Participants wore polarized 3D glasses and the room was dimly-lit.
The software for collecting movement information and real-time rendering was custom-built (https://github.
com/JasonFriedman/RepeatedMeasures) written in Matlab (MathWorks). The system delay for movement visu-
alization was 80 ms30.
A separate computer running Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems) was used to control stimulation and 
data collection for the intentional binding task. A response button was placed approximately 3 cm under the par-
ticipants’ index fingers and participants wore headphones (Seinheisser HD280) for auditory stimulation.
Design. We implemented a 2 × 2 within-participant-design and manipulated two bodily self-cues –form and 
movement congruency – during this task (see Fig. 2 for overview experimental conditions). For the visual form 
manipulation, either a virtual hand or a virtual sphere was visible. The virtual sphere corresponded to approximately 
the same size and location as the tip of the index finger. For the movement congruency manipulation, the displayed 
movement of the virtual hand or sphere was either congruent and in the same direction to the movement of the 
participant’s actual index finger (i.e., a downward finger movement to press the response button resulted in the 
displayed finger or sphere image moving downward at the same time) or the displayed movement was incongruent 
and in the opposite direction to the movement of the participant’s index finger (i.e., a downward finger movement to 
press the response button resulted in the displayed finger or sphere image moving upward at the same time).
Measures. Embodiment ratings. We used two modified ratings scale items that have been used to investi-
gate embodiment changes especially related to the embodiment subcomponent “ownership” in the rubber hand 
illusion paradigm3. These items were: Q1) “I felt as the 3d image was my hand” and Q2) “I felt as if the virtual 
hand/dot display was part of my body”. These ratings were used as a manipulation check to confirm that our 
experimental manipulations did indeed change the sense of embodiment. Participants completed embodiment 
ratings on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 7 (‘strongly agree’) after the agency ratings 
(i.e., four times in total).
Intentional binding task. We used an implicit agency measure known as the intentional binding paradigm. We 
implemented the interval estimation version of the intentional binding task because it is well-suited to measuring 
intentional binding effects in tasks that involve visual stimuli5,35. The structure of each trial in the interval estima-
tion intentional binding task is shown in Fig. 2. Participants first saw a fixation cross in the centre of the screen 
Figure 1. Virtual-hand and intentional binding task setup. (A) Participants wore a motion-capture glove 
and placed their hands under a mirror on a hand-rest. The participants’ index fingers were placed on top of a 
response button and participants wore headphones to listen to the tones of the intentional binding task. (B) 
Participants wore 3D glasses and viewed rendered hands (C) or spheres (D) at the same depth and location as 
the participants’ hidden hands.
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for 1500 ms. The fixation cross then disappeared and participants saw a virtual display with a rendered hand 
or sphere (depending on the experimental condition, details of conditions below). This virtual representation 
responded to movements of the participant’s actual hand throughout each trial. Participants were instructed to 
move their index finger down and press a response button at a time of their choosing. The response button trig-
gered an auditory tone (1000 Hz for 100 ms duration) after a delay. Participants were told that the interval would 
randomly vary between 1 and 500 ms. In reality there were only three possible delay intervals: 100 ms, 250 ms and 
400 ms. After the tone, participants estimated the interval between their action (button press) and the start of the 
consequent tone. Participants were asked to report numbers in the range from 1 to 500 ms. Participants verbally 
reported their estimate and this was recorded by the experimenter. Participants were asked to rest their index fin-
ger above the response button at the end of each trial. There were four blocked experimental conditions and each 
delay interval was repeated 20 times resulting in 60 randomly-presented trials per condition.
Agency ratings. To measure explicit agency experience, we used the Sense of Agency Rating Scale (SOARS)34. 
SOARS has two factors: Involuntariness, which represents a subjective reduction in control over one’s own actions 
(e.g., “I felt that my experiences and actions were not caused by me”); and Effortlessness, which represents a sub-
jective increase in the ease and automaticity with which actions occur (e.g., “My experiences and actions occurred 
effortlessly”). This scale was originally developed to measure general agency changes in the context of hypnosis 
but we used a modified version with general wording applicable to any context8. The SOARS requires participants 
to rate their level of agreement with a series of 10 statements using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (‘strongly 
disagree’) to 7 (‘strongly agree’). Participants completed a pen and paper copy of this scale after each experimental 
block (i.e., four times in total).
Procedure. Participants put the data glove on their right hand, which was then placed onto a hand support 
under the mirror display. Participants were asked to respond in the intentional binding task by pressing the but-
ton with finger-flexion movements that were approximately 3 cm in depth. After each movement participants 
positioned their finger above the response button as they waited for the next trial to begin. Participants completed 
four blocks of the intentional binding task. We blocked the conditions because we were concerned that sudden 
changes in form or movement congruency could lead to surprise and affect the intentional binding measure. 
Blocking the trials also allowed us to probe changes in explicit ratings of embodiment and agency after each 
block. At the completion of each block participants filled out the SOARS scale and embodiment ratings, reporting 
their experiences in the preceding block. The order of conditions was counterbalanced across participants. The 
experiment took 60 minutes to complete.
Statistical analysis. For explicit embodiment and agency rating analyses we conducted 2 form (hand ver-
sus dot) × 2 movement congruency (congruent versus incongruent) ANOVA on Embodiment items Q1 and Q2, 
as well as SOARS Involuntariness and SOARS Effortlessness ratings. We found non-normal rating response 
Figure 2. Trial structure and schema of experimental conditions. Each trial started with fixation. Participants 
then saw a rendered virtual object – either a hand or a sphere. Participants were asked to move the index finger 
down to press a button. The index finger of the virtual hand or sphere moved either congruently and downwards 
(blue arrow) or incongruently and upwards (red arrow). The button press was followed by a tone after an 
interval of either 100, 250 or 400 ms. Participants were then asked to estimate the interval between button press 
action and consequent tone.
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distributions for some rating scales (Shapiro-Wilk tests, p < 0.05). However, ANOVA are robust also for 
non-normally distributed data when the sample size is equal36.
To analyse the intentional binding data, we conducted a 2 (form: hand versus dot) × 2 (movement congruency: 
congruent versus incongruent) × 3 (interval: 100 ms versus 250 ms versus 400 ms) repeated measures ANOVA on 
participants’ interval estimates. Finally, we conducted correlation analyses to investigate the associations between 
intentional binding effects and explicit measures of embodiment and agency.
Data availability. The datasets analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding 
author on reasonable request.
Results
Embodiment ratings. We first analysed participants’ embodiment ratings to ensure that our manipulations 
did lead to changes in embodiment experiences. There were two embodiment rating scale items: Embodiment 
item Q1 – “I felt as if the 3d image was my hand” and Q2 – “I felt as if the virtual hand/dot display was part of my 
body”. As expected, for Q1 the ANOVA revealed a main effect of form (F[1, 29] = 16.13, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.357) 
with higher embodiment ratings for the hand conditions (M = 4.42, 95% CI [3.80, 5.04]) compared to the sphere 
conditions (M = 3.40, 95% CI [2.81, 3.99], see Fig. 3). There was also a main effect of movement congruency  
(F[1, 29] = 4.97, p = 0.034, ηp2 = 0.146) with higher ratings for congruent (M = 4.20, 95% CI [3.61, 4.79]) com-
pared to incongruent movements (M = 3.62, 95% CI [2.99, 4.25]). There was no interaction of form and movement 
congruency for Q1 (F[1, 29] = 0.89, p = 0.352, partial ηp2 = 0.030). Neither form or movement congruency had a 
significant impact on Q2 ratings (all p > 0.05).
Implicit Sense of Agency: Intentional Binding. Our main measure of interest was intentional binding 
scores, as an implicit sense of agency measure (Table 1; Fig. 4). An unsurprising main effect of interval (F[2, 
58] = 66.12, p < 0.001; ηp2 = 0.695) indicated that participants’ estimates increased with increased interval con-
ditions. Importantly, we found a main effect of movement congruency (F[1, 29] = 6.16, p = 0.019, ηp2 = 0.18) such 
that participants’ overall estimates were lower when movements were congruent (M = 199.13, 95% CI [172.98, 
225.28]) compared to when they were incongruent (M = 219.22, 95% CI [195.96, 242.48]). Form did not signifi-
cantly influence intentional binding estimates (F[1, 29] = 0.12, p = 0.730, ηp2 = 0.004) and there was no significant 
interaction of form and movement congruency (F[1, 29] = 0.005, p = 0.947, ηp2 < 0.001). There were also no signifi-
cant interactions with interval (all p > 0.05).
Explicit Sense of Agency: Sense of Agency Rating Scale. The SOARS scale provided an explicit measure 
of general agency experience. We found a main effect of form for SOARS Effortlessness (F[1, 29] = 4.34, p = 0.046, 
ηp2 = 0.130), with greater effortlessness in the sphere condition (M = 24.37, 95% CI [22.92, 25.81]) than in the 
hand condition (M = 23.45, 95% CI [22.09, 24.81]). There was no significant main effect of movement congruency 
(F[1, 29] = 1.72, p = 0.20, ηp2 = 0.056) and no significant interaction of form and movement congruency (F[1, 
29] = 0.05, p = 0.82, ηp2 = 0.002). There were no significant effects for the SOARS Involuntariness scale (all p > 0.05).
Correlations implicit and explicit measures. We next looked at associations between intentional binding 
and explicit measures of embodiment and agency. As movement congruency was the only factor that influenced 
binding scores we calculated the difference between congruent and incongruent movement conditions, collapsed 
Figure 3. Embodiment ratings (Q1) for form and movement congruency conditions. We found a main effect 
of Form, F(1, 29) = 16.13, p < 0.001. Explicit embodiment was rated higher in the hand compared to the sphere 
conditions. There was also a main effect of movement congruency, F(1, 29) = 4.97, p = 0.034, with higher ratings 
for congruent (blue circles) compared to incongruent movements (red squares). Bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals.
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across form, for each variable (binding scores, SOARS Involuntariness SOARS Effortlessness, Embodiment items 
Q1 and Q2). This allowed us to explore whether the effect of movement congruency correlated across these 
measures. There were no significant associations between the effects of congruency on intentional binding and 
explicit measures of embodiment and agency (binding scores – SOARS Involuntariness: r = −0.177, p = 0.348; 
binding scores – SOARS Effortlessness: r = 0.143, p = 0.451; binding scores – Embodiment item Q1: r = −0.007, 
p = 0.970; binding scores – Embodiment item Q:2 r = −0.178, p = 0.348). Furthermore, we also found no sig-
nificant associations between the effects of congruency on explicit measures of agency and explicit measures of 
embodiment (SOARS Involuntariness – Embodiment item Q1: r = −0.094, p = 0.621; SOARS Involuntariness – 
Embodiment item Q2: r = −0.248, p = 0.187; SOARS Effortlessness – Embodiment item Q1: r = 0.097, p = 0.609; 
SOARS Effortlessness – Embodiment item Q2 r = 0.125, p = 0.509).
Discussion
We investigated the effects of form and movement congruency on embodiment and agency using an intentional 
binding task. Binding was significantly affected by the congruency of visual and non-visual movement signals. 
When visual and non-visual movement information was congruent (i.e., a downward movement was viewed 
when the index finger moved downward to press the button) binding increased (i.e., interval estimates were 
lower) compared to when movement signals were incongruent (i.e., an upward movement was viewed when the 
index finger moved downward to press the button). This finding is in line with previous research that suggests that 
the matching of movement type is an important factor for implicit agency5,29.
However, body form plausibility did not modulate the effect of movement congruency on implicit agency. 
In other words, we found no evidence that the movement congruency effect is different in body-contexts 
compared to non-body contexts. This suggests that the movement type matching mechanism between 
visual and non-visual signals that modulates agency is not body-specific as has been previously suggested by 
Caspar et al.5.
We also found no significant main effect of form on binding. This suggests that implicit agency does not 
depend on the viewed virtual object being a visually plausible representation of one’s own hand. This is in line 
Movement Form
100 ms 250 ms 400 ms
Mean (in ms) 95% CI Mean (in ms) 95% CI Mean (in ms) 95% CI
Congruent
Hand 145 115–175 190 162–218 258 222–294
Sphere 141 114–167 197 165–229 264 227–302
Incongruent
Hand 164 134–193 216 187–244 275 244–306
Sphere 159 131–186 219 195–244 283 248–317
Table 1. Average interval estimates for each experimental condition at each interval duration. CI, 95% 
Confidence Interval.
Figure 4. Interval estimates for form and movement congruency conditions. The interval estimates are 
averaged across all three presented interval durations (i.e., 100, 250, and 400 ms). We found a main effect of 
movement congruency, F(1, 29) = 6.16, p = 0.019. Intentional binding was reduced (larger time estimates) in 
the incongruent (red squares) compared to the congruent condition (lower time estimates, blue circles). Bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals.
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with the previous finding that anatomical plausibility with respect to viewed hand orientation (i.e., viewing a 
hand in an upright and anatomical plausible orientation versus a hand turned by 180° and anatomical implausible 
orientation) does not modulate implicit agency9. Thus overall, there is consistent evidence that the anatomical 
plausibility of visual information for one’s own body and thus viewing movement within a body-context does not 
modulate implicit agency.
In contrast, our study supports previous work showing that the anatomical plausibility of visual information 
for one’s own body influences embodiment and also explicit agency measures6,8–10. Although here, in contrast 
to our previous work8, we surprisingly found that viewing a body form decreased effortlessness (i.e., increased 
agency), compared to viewing a sphere. It may be possible that because the sphere was smaller than the hand, 
tracking movements was harder (took more effort) in this condition. Overall, although there is consistent evi-
dence that anatomical plausibility does not modulate implicit agency, it appears that anatomical plausibility 
may modulate explicit agency. It may be possible that explicit agency judgements are more likely influenced by 
participants’ intuitions and expectations about the link between their own bodies and their perceived action 
control.
Intriguingly we did not find an effect of movement congruency on our explicit agency measure. This finding 
is inconsistent with previous work suggesting that movement congruency also modulates explicit agency5,29. It’s 
possible that this is because our agency rating scale was too broadly focused on the general phenomenology of 
causality. The SOARS scale has been used to discriminate agency experiences related to different types of hypnotic 
suggestion32 and different types of clinical symptoms in schizophrenia37. It may be that although this measure is 
able to tap high level cognitive attributions about agency in different contexts, it is less sensitive to the low level 
sensorimotor movement cues used in this study.
As expected, we did find a significant effect of movement congruency and form for the embodiment item 
Q1 (“I felt as if the 3d image was my hand”). This item is thought to be a core indicator of embodiment in the 
rubber hand illusion paradigm3,27,38. Furthermore, we found no interaction between the two bodily-self cues 
movement congruency and form. This is in line with previous work manipulating synchrony and form in both 
movement-based10 and touch-based8 virtual versions of the rubber hand illusion paradigm and suggests that 
each of these bodily-self cues does not constraint the influence of the other. Surprisingly, we did not find signif-
icant effects for item Q2 (“I felt as if the virtual hand/dot display was part of my body”). This item has been less 
commonly used in the rubber hand literature, and the null effect here might be due to the fact that in our study 
the virtual object was presented without implied connection to one’s own body (i.e., participants viewed a hand 
disconnected from any arm). The perceived connection of external objects has been shown to modulate embod-
iment illusions22,39 and might be more relevant for some embodiment items than others. One limitation in our 
work was that we did not employ an implicit embodiment measure such as the perceived hand position5,6,27,40. 
However, movement congruency and form have both consistently been found to modulate both explicit and 
implicit embodiment in previous studies5,41.
Considering these results together with the previous literature, what can we infer about the links between 
agency and embodiment mechanisms? First, consistent with previous research, our measures of implicit 
and explicit self-perception differed at least to some extent4,29,42–44. Explicit and implicit measures for 
self-representation are typically affected by the same cues, however the relative influence of specific cues can also 
differ across measures as well as task contexts. This suggests (at least partly) independent mechanisms for implicit 
and explicit aspects of self-representation42–44.
Second, both implicit and explicit measures of agency and embodiment were modulated by the com-
parison of visual and non-visual movement signals. In this study, and in previous work, movement congru-
ency influenced all measures of self-perception5,29. This supports a view that both agency and embodiment 
mechanisms operate by making comparisons across different signals. These comparisons might involve 
internal and/or proprioceptive information associated with the generation of a movement with visual feed-
back about that movement. Furthermore, this matching mechanism does not necessarily have to involve a 
spatio-temporal pattern of sensorimotor signals, but instead could involve the matching of intended action 
goals and perceived events4. In other words, instead of comparing the low-level visual and non-visual move-
ment direction cues, the matching mechanism might compare higher-level representations such as ‘upward’ 
versus ‘downward’.
Third, embodiment mechanisms may be predominately influenced by spatio-temporal matching of low-level 
body-related signals. Whereas agency could depend to a greater extent on higher-level mechanisms that compare 
more general representations of intended action goals and perceived events45,46. Support for this idea comes from 
our and previous results showing that, in contrast to agency, embodiment is more strongly affected by visual 
form and anatomical plausibility cues6 and subject to stricter temporal constraints24. Furthermore, it is notable 
that we did not find significant correlations of movement congruency effects across different measures. Overall 
this suggests that the comparison mechanisms differ (at least to some extent) for implicit and explicit agency and 
embodiment, but that on a general level all mechanisms involve comparisons across different (e.g., visually and 
non-visually derived) signals.
In conclusion, we found that movement congruency enhances implicit agency and that this effect does not 
depend on the presence of body-specific signals such as viewing a body form in an anatomical plausible orien-
tation. In contrast, both movement congruency and the anatomical plausibility of viewed body information are 
important factors for embodiment mechanisms. On a more general level, our findings suggest that both implicit 
and explicit agency and embodiment mechanisms depend on comparison mechanisms that match different types 
of signals. These comparisons however seem to be influenced by distinct factors and spatio-temporal boundaries 
which suggests that they involve different types of representations.
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